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Abstract. The biological beneﬁts of marine reserves have garnered favor in the
conservation community, but ‘‘no-take’’ reserve implementation is complicated by the
economic interests of ﬁshery stakeholders. There are now a number of studies examining the
conditions under which marine reserves can provide both economic and ecological beneﬁts. A
potentially important reality of ﬁshing that these studies overlook is that ﬁshing can damage
the habitat of the target stock. Here, we construct an equilibrium bioeconomic model that
incorporates this habitat damage and show that the designation of marine reserves, coupled
with the implementation of a tax on ﬁshing effort, becomes both biologically and economically
favorable as habitat sensitivity increases. We also study the effects of varied degrees of spatial
control on ﬁsheries management. Together, our results provide further evidence for the
potential monetary and biological value of spatial management, and the possibility of a
mutually beneﬁcial resolution to the ﬁsherman–conservationist marine reserve designation
dilemma.
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INTRODUCTION
The overexploitation of many marine ﬁsh stocks,
despite intense regulation, has caused ﬁsheries scientists
and economists to examine the relative effectiveness of
alternative management forms. One form, the establish-
ment of permanent ‘‘no-take’’ marine reserves, has
garnered particular favor with the conservation com-
munity. Where reserves have been successfully estab-
lished, they have rapidly become sanctuaries for elevated
stock biomass and population density, shown elevated
levels of biodiversity, and protected intact habitat
relative to adjacent ﬁshed areas (reviewed in Halpern
and Warner 2003 and Lester et al. 2009). However,
reserves may face steep opposition when closures are
perceived as economically costly.
The prohibition of ﬁshing in a reserve removes any
enclosed stock biomass from harvester access, and forces
ﬁshermen to either reduce overall effort, or intensify
ﬁshing elsewhere (Smith and Wilen 2003). Nevertheless,
many bioeconomic analyses indicate that the establish-
ment of marine reserves can have both economic and
biological beneﬁts (see Plate 1). Whether reserves are
economically optimal depends upon the cost of ﬁshing
and species life history. In particular, reserves are more
likely to be economically efﬁcient when they are net
exporters of larvae or harvestable biomass (Gerber et al.
2003, Sanchirico et al. 2006, White and Kendall 2007;
but see Ga˚rdmark et al. [2006] for an exception), when
they encompass areas that would be costly to ﬁsh in their
absence (Smith and Wilen 2003, Sanchirico et al. 2006),
or when ﬁsh stocks are already overexploited (Gerber et
al. 2003).
In many of the models used to reach these
conclusions, the spatial dimension is represented
implicitly and reserves are designated as a ﬁxed fraction
of habitat—and thus a ﬁxed fraction of the stock—that
is closed to ﬁshing. For a range of reserve sizes, stock
biomass and ﬁshing intensity are then calculated to
maximize yield or proﬁt (Gerber et al. 2003; see
Ga˚rdmark et al. 2006 and White and Kendall 2007
for examples). An alternative modeling strategy begins
with a spatially explicit model (e.g., a partial differen-
tial equation) describing the population dynamics of a
stock living in continuous habitat. The spatial distri-
bution of effort is then calculated according to
economic assumptions about the property rights and
behavior of ﬁshermen. The optimality of reserves may
emerge from this analysis when ﬁshed species are
mobile and habitat is heterogeneous (Neubert 2003,
Costello and Polasky 2008).
Whatever form these theoretical analyses have taken,
they have almost all neglected the potential for habitat-
damaging effects of ﬁshing (Armstrong and Falk-
Petersen 2008). Fishing-driven habitat damage may
reduce the habitat’s ability to support ﬁsh stocks
through biomass removal and reduction in habitat
complexity (Fogarty 2005, Hiddink et al. 2006b).
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Modeling and empirical evidence suggest that habitats
may display a wide range of sensitivities to damage from
ﬁshing gear (Auster 1998, Watling and Norse 1998,
Fogarty 2005, Hiddink et al. 2006a, b), and it has been
suggested that reserves may be more economically
effective when protecting the most vulnerable habitat
(National Research Council 2001, Hiddink et al. 2007).
This raises the question: Can no-take reserves be
optimal (i.e., revenue maximizing) when ﬁshing damages
the habitat of the targeted stock?
While a number of published studies touch on the
relationship between habitat quality and the economic
beneﬁts of reserves, to our knowledge none addresses
this question directly. In some analyses (Rodwell et al.
2003, Sanchirico 2004, Armstrong and Skonhoft 2006,
Armstrong 2007), habitat inside a reserve is better for
the protected stock (e.g., has increased carrying capacity
or lower natural mortality) than habitat that is outside
of the reserve—even when there is no ﬁshing outside of
the reserve. The damage that occurs to habitat outside of
the reserves in these models, therefore, cannot be due to
ﬁshing (at least not ﬁshing on the target stock). Mangel
(2000) studied a model in which habitat destruction
occurring outside of a protected area occurs randomly
and is independent of ﬁshing effort. Holland and
Schnier (2006) studied the efﬁcacy of an ‘‘individual
habitat quota’’ system for managing the deleterious
impact of ﬁshing on essential ﬁsh habitat, but in their
models habitat quality does not affect the vital rates of
the stock species.
So the question of reserve optimality in the face of
habitat damage remains. To address this question, we
consider a model in which the habitat damage generated
by ﬁshing decreases the quantity or quality of spatial
resources. Intraspeciﬁc competition subsequently inten-
siﬁes, reducing the birth rate or increasing the mortality
rate of the harvested species (Lindholm et al. 2001). In
this study, we consider a range of habitat sensitivities to
ﬁshing (Auster 1998).
We analyze this model from several economic
perspectives. First, we consider an unmanaged baseline:
the ‘‘open-access’’ case, in which effort equilibrates at a
level that dissipates proﬁt at every location (Sanchirico
and Wilen 1999). We contrast this unregulated system
with three tax-based management strategies: (1) a
nonspatial tax strategy, in which the manager taxes each
unit of effort equally; (2) a tax and reserve strategy, in
which the manager designates a centrally located ﬁshery
closure and taxes every unit of effort outside the reserve
equally; and (3) a spatial tax strategy, in which the
manager taxes ﬁshing effort differentially based on its
spatial location.
We choose a tax-based management scheme for its
mathematical convenience. The results we obtain,
however, could be duplicated, in principle, using a
variety of other policy instruments (e.g., individual catch
quotas, or enforced closures). Our analysis of multiple
management strategies allows us to assess the value of
spatial knowledge, and determine the management
consequences of varying degrees of spatial control. The
‘‘spatial-tax’’ case, while possibly difﬁcult to implement
in the real world, provides a reference case against which
lesser degrees of management can be measured.
In each case, we ﬁnd the management action that
maximizes the tax revenue collected by the manager. The
spatial distribution of effort that results is equivalent to
the distribution that would maximize rent to a sole
owner (Appendix A). Thus, maximizing tax revenue is
equivalent, in our model, to maximizing rent.
We demonstrate improvements in tax revenue and
standing stock biomass as the manager’s degree of
spatial control improves. We also show that the
inclusion of habitat-damaging ﬁshing effects in this
model increases the range of ecological and economic
conditions under which marine reserves are part of an
optimal (revenue-maximizing) management strategy.
THE MODEL
We build on the model of Neubert and Herrera
(2008), who consider a stock whose population density
N at location X and time T changes as a result of local
population growth, diffusion, and harvesting. In one
spatial dimension, such a stock evolves in time according
to the following partial differential equation:
]N
]T
¼ gðNÞ þ D ]
2N
]X2
 qEðXÞN ð1Þ
where g is the rate of population growth and D is the
diffusion coefﬁcient. Let us assume that harvesting
occurs at a rate that is proportional to both the stock
density and the effort density, E(X ). The ‘‘catchability
coefﬁcient,’’ q, is the proportionality constant.
At equilibrium ]N/]T¼ 0, so we may write N(X,T )¼
N(X ), and Eq. 1 becomes
D
]2N
]X2
¼ qEðXÞN  gðNÞ: ð2Þ
Since suitable habitat for any real stock is ﬁnite, we
assume that ﬁsh cannot survive outside of a stretch of
habitat of length L. That is, N(X ) ¼ 0 for jxj . L/2.
Since we expect N(X ) to be continuous, we impose the
following boundary conditions:
NðL=2Þ ¼ NðL=2Þ ¼ 0: ð3Þ
That is, the ﬁsh population density drops to zero at the
habitat edges. We consider alternative boundary condi-
tions in a subsequent section.
In our model, habitat quality is reﬂected in the birth
and mortality rates b(N ) and d(N ) that comprise the
function g:
gðNÞ ¼ ½bðNÞ  dðNÞ N: ð4Þ
So that the population will not grow without bound, we
posit that the birth rate declines with population density
while the mortality rate grows with population density
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(Sinclair 1989), i.e.,
bðNÞ ¼ b0  b1N and dðNÞ ¼ d0 þ d1N: ð5Þ
Combining Eq. 5 with Eq. 4 results in logistic
population growth in the absence of harvesting.
To capture the habitat-damaging effects of ﬁshing we
next assume that as ﬁshing effort increases, density-
dependent effects are intensiﬁed, as by increased compe-
tition between individual ﬁsh for resources like food,
shelter, or spawning area. We model this effect by
positing linear increases in b1 and d1 with increasing effort
(Auster 1998), and replace g(N ) in Eqs. 1 and 2 with
gðN;EÞ ¼ ½b0  d0  ðb1 þ d1 þ hEÞNN: ð6Þ
We call the constant h the habitat sensitivity. Its value will
in general depend upon the nature of the habitat (e.g., the
complexity and resilience of the biotic and abiotic
structures), upon the ﬁshing gear employed, upon the
features of the habitat damaged by that gear, and upon
how those habitat features are used by the target species
(e.g., as a nursery, refuge, feeding ground, and so forth).
In our model, the level of ﬁshing effort at any location
results from the collective activity of a large number of
harvesters who decide to enter or exit the ﬁshery based
upon the possibility of making a proﬁt. In the face of a
ﬁxed price p, the proﬁt generated at location X is the
difference between the total revenue at location X,
TRðXÞ ¼ pqEðXÞNðXÞ ð7Þ
and the total cost of ﬁshing at location X, TC(X ).
Let us assume that the cost per unit effort at a given
location is w0 þ w1E(x), where w0 is the cost of the ﬁrst
unit of effort. Costs increase at the rate w1, reﬂecting the
increasing costs that harvesters impose upon one
another when more of them try to ﬁsh in the same
location. If ﬁshermen must also pay a tax per unit effort,
T(X ), the total cost at location X is given by
TCðXÞ ¼ ½w0 þ w1EðXÞ þ TðXÞ EðXÞ: ð8Þ
Subtracting the total cost (Eq. 8) from the total revenue
(Eq. 7) gives the revenue density (i.e., the proﬁt per unit
habitat length)
RðXÞ ¼ pqEðXÞNðXÞ  ½w0 þ w1EðXÞ þ TðXÞ EðXÞ: ð9Þ
We will assume that the ﬁshery has ‘‘open access,’’ and
that ﬁshing effort at any location equilibrates so that the
revenue density (Eq. 9) vanishes at every location
(Sanchirico and Wilen 1999). The simultaneous solution
of the equilibrium condition (Eq. 2) and the open access
condition, R(X ) ¼ 0, determines the effort density and
stock density that would result from any speciﬁcation of
the tax T(X ).
Maximizing tax revenues
Now we take the perspective of the ﬁsheries manager,
whose objective is to maximize tax revenue (P)
PðTðXÞÞ ¼
Z L=2
L=2
TðXÞEðXÞdX ð10Þ
by choosing the best tax distribution subject to regula-
tory constraints. We imagine that these constraints might
take three forms: In the first form (Case I), any tax the
manager imposes must be the same at every location.
That is, T(X )¼Tns, where Tns is a nonnegative constant.
We will call this a ‘‘nonspatial tax.’’ As an alternative
(Case II), which we will call ‘‘tax and reserve,’’ the
manager may choose to supplement the nonspatial effort
tax (Tns) with a single, centrally located spatial reserve of
length Lr within which fishing is prohibited. Under the
least restrictive alternative (Case III), the manager is free
to choose a different tax rate at every spatial location (as
long as T(X ) is a nonnegative piecewise-continuous
function). We will call this a ‘‘spatial tax.’’
The solution of the manager’s optimization problem
in Cases I and II can be found by direct searches (over
Tns in Case I; over Tns and Lr in Case II). The solution in
Case III involves methods from optimal control theory
which we develop in Appendix A.
Before we report the results of our analysis, note that
our model has 12 parameters. However, the change of
variables
u ¼ b1 þ d1
b0  d0 N
t ¼ ðb0  d0ÞT
x ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b0  d0
D
r
X
s ¼ b1 þ d1
pqðb0  d0ÞT
f ¼ q
b0  d0 E
R ¼ b1 þ d1
pðb0  d0Þ2
R
P ¼ b1 þ d1
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðb0  d0Þ3D
q P ð11Þ
shows that the model actually only depends upon the six
dimensionless parameter groups:
‘ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b0  d0
D
r
L
c ¼ hðb0 þ d0Þ
qðb1 þ d1Þ
x0 ¼ w0ðb1 þ d1Þ
pqðb0  d0Þ
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x1 ¼ w1ðb1 þ d1Þ
pq2
sns ¼ b1 þ d1
pqðb0  d0ÞTns
‘r ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b0  d0
D
r
Lr: ð12Þ
(See Appendix A for the dimensionless version of the
model.) In the results that follow, we hold constant the
rescaled habitat size (at ‘¼ 15) and the rescaled costs (at
x0 ¼ 0.01 and x1 ¼ 0.001) and examine how habitat
sensitivity (c) affects the relative tax revenues that can be
produced under the three regulatory cases. We report
equilibrium results from the model. Our numerical
simulations suggest that these emerge regardless of
initial conditions.
RESULTS
Unmanaged baseline
When the ﬁshery is unmanaged (i.e., sns ¼ 0 and ‘r ¼
0), ﬁshing effort is constant in the central portion of the
habitat, and drops to zero near the habitat edges, where
stock density is low because ﬁsh are leaving the habitat
(Fig. 1a). The size of these unﬁshed edge regions
depends upon the economic balance between catch
value and the cost of obtaining the catch, which together
determine a threshold stock density below which ﬁshing
is uneconomical. This threshold density varies with our
choices of x0 (the cost of the ﬁrst unit of effort) and x1
(the rate of increase of cost), but changes to these
parameters (particularly x1, which we varied over
several orders of magnitude) did not qualitatively
change our results.
As habitat sensitivity increases, habitat quality
degrades under unrestricted effort, reducing the local
population density and, consequently, the local effort
density (Fig. 1b). Although the spatial distributions of
ﬁsh biomass and ﬁshing effort do not change qualita-
tively with increasing habitat sensitivity, their spatially
integrated values, as well as the total yield, decline as
habitat becomes more sensitive to ﬁshing damage (Fig.
1c).
Case I. Nonspatial effort tax
The imposition of a nonspatial tax reduces effort
throughout the habitat (Fig. 2, compare panels a and d)
because harvesters experience an additional cost per unit
effort (effectively increasing x0). The edge unﬁshed areas
increase in size because a higher stock density is required
to support any ﬁshing effort under these increased costs.
The tax-induced effort reductions result in higher stock
densities throughout the habitat.
The optimal tax rate is chosen to maximize the tax
revenue collected by the manager, and represents a
trade-off between increasing revenue per unit effort, and
decreasing levels of effort with increasing tax rates (Fig.
2g–i). Habitat damage reduces the productivity of the
ﬁshery, and therefore reduces the proﬁtability per unit
ﬁshing effort, in turn reducing total effort. The manager
compensates for the reductions in effort (and therefore
tax revenue) by lowering the tax rate (Fig. 3). This
reduction in tax rate opens a slightly larger fraction of
habitat to ﬁshing (i.e., the unﬁshed habitat edge margin
decreases) because the cost per unit effort experienced by
ﬁshermen is lowered and, therefore, the threshold
FIG. 1. Effects of habitat sensitivity on the unmanaged
baseline. (a, b) Spatial distributions of stock density (solid line)
and effort density (dashed line) in the absence of any
management for habitat sensitivity c ¼ 0 and c ¼ 15,
respectively. (c) Effort (i.e., the effort density integrated from
0 to ‘, dashed line), stock biomass (i.e., the stock density,
integrated from 0 to ‘, solid line), and yield (dotted line) in the
unmanaged case. For all three panels in this ﬁgure, we set the
habitat length (‘) to 15, and the cost parameters x0 and x1 to
0.01 and 0.001, respectively; the tax per unit effort s ¼ 0. All
plotted quantities are unitless.
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TABLE 1. Explanations of the variables and parameters used in our study, together with their
typical units
Symbol Description Units
Dimensionless
version
Variables
X space km x
T time yr t
N(X,T ) stock density tonnes/km u(x,t)
E(X ) effort density vessel dayskm1yr1 f(x)
R(X ) revenue density dollarsyr1km1 R (x)
T (X ) effort tax dollars/vessel day s(x)
P equilibrium tax revenue P
Parameters
b0 low-density birth rate yr
1
d0 low-density mortality rate yr
1
b1 density-dependent birth rate tonne
1yr1
d1 density-dependent mortality rate tonnes
1yr1
h habitat sensitivity kmtonne1yr1 c
D diffusion coefﬁcient km2/yr
L habitat length km ‘
Lr reserve length km ‘r
q catchability coefﬁcient km/vessel day
p price dollars/tonne
w0 effort cost dollars/vessel day x0
w1 congestion cost dollars(vessel day)2kmyr x1
Tns nonspatial effort tax dollars/vessel day sns
Notes: ‘‘Stock density’’ is the same as ‘‘biomass density’’; ‘‘effort density’’ is the same as ‘‘ﬁshing
density.’’ SI conversion: 1 tonne¼ 1000 kg¼ 1 Mg.
FIG. 2. How management strategies work. (a–c) These left-hand panels show the effects of increasing central reserve size: effort
(dashed line) is displaced to the habitat edges, and piles up at the reserve edges to capture any ﬁsh exiting the undamaged habitat.
Stock populations thrive in the reserve: their size approaches the carrying capacity when the reserves is sufﬁciently large [as in panel
(c)]. (d–f ) The central column shows the effects of the addition of a nonspatial tax [sns¼ 0 in panels (a)–(c); sns¼ 0.24 in panels (d)–
(f ). This tax reduces effort everywhere within the habitat. (g–i) As the tax rate increases, total effort decreases (dashed line), and
total stock recovers (solid line). For a given reserve size, the manager should select the tax rate that maximizes revenues (dotted
line). As reserve size increases, the optimal tax rate (indicated by the black arrow) decreases.
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biomass density at which ﬁshing occurs is also reduced
(Fig. 4a–e).
In general, in more sensitive (i.e., higher c) habitats,
the optimal effort density is lower and the area over
which the effort is distributed is slightly larger (Fig. 4a–
e) when taxes cannot be adjusted spatially.
Case II. Nonspatial effort tax with reserve
When the management strategy includes a single
reserve, that reserve provides a refuge that supports
elevated biomass densities (Fig. 2b, c). Effort piles up on
the reserve edges, where ﬁshermen ‘‘ﬁsh the line’’
(Kellner et al. 2007) to capture any ﬁsh that are leaving
the reserve.
Again, the manager’s goal is to maximize tax revenue
(Fig. 2e, f ), in this case by balancing loss of ﬁshing area
and, thus, lost taxable effort, with increased stock size,
which supports elevated ﬁshing effort outside the
reserve.
In this case, we ﬁnd that reserve establishment is
optimal only when habitat sensitivity is sufﬁciently high
(c . 1.25; Figs. 3 and 4f–j). By using reserves, the
manager can protect ﬁsh populations within a central
region of the habitat, resulting in elevated effort levels at
reserve edges, where ﬁshermen compete to catch
spillover (Fig. 4f–j). Because the manager has a two-
pronged management mechanism, he or she can also set
a lower tax rate than is possible with a ﬂat effort tax
alone (Fig. 3). Thus, optimal tax is inversely related to
the fraction of habitat in reserve.
Case III. Spatially variable effort tax
When ﬁshing does not damage habitat (c¼ 0), we ﬁnd
that the optimal spatial tax produces an effort distribu-
tion that includes unﬁshed areas at the habitat edges,
where biomass density is low (Fig. 4k). Just inside of
these low-biomass regions, however, ﬁshing intensity is
highest, as the ﬁshermen attempt to capture ﬁsh before
they swim out of the habitat and are lost. The manager
encourages these efforts by lowering the tax rate as the
stock density declines toward the habitat edges (Appen-
dix A: Fig. A1). The center of the habitat is ﬁshed at a
low but constant effort level, and is ﬂanked by reserves
enforced by higher tax levels, where stock density is
slightly elevated. The emergence of these reserves has
been reported before (Neubert and Herrera 2008), and
provides evidence of the importance of spatial manage-
ment.
As we incorporate habitat damage, these reserves
expand and reserve networks of ﬁxed size emerge as the
optimal management strategy (Fig. 4l–o). By establish-
ing reserve networks, the manager restricts habitat
damage to relatively narrow ﬁshed zones and sets aside
up to 80% of habitat in reserves (Fig. 3, dotted line). The
adjacent reserves support elevated biomass density,
which then spills over into the ﬁshed areas.
To test for the role of edge effects in driving this
network pattern, we repeated our analysis for a variety
of habitat lengths (Fig. 5). Note that, because of our
model rescaling (Eq. 12), increasing habitat size could
represent either actual increases in spatial habitat extent,
or decreases in ﬁsh movement rates in the original
FIG. 3. Optimal tax levels under ‘‘nonspatial-tax’’ (solid line) and ‘‘tax-and-reserve’’ (dashed line) management strategies, and
corresponding reserve fractions for varying habitat sensitivities. The manager responds to increasing habitat sensitivity by lowering
tax rates, effectively opening more of the habitat for ﬁshing. When reserves are available, the fraction of habitat placed in reserve
increases with increasing habitat sensitivity and enables the use of a lower tax rate. The optimal habitat fraction in reserve for the
‘‘spatial-tax’’ case is also shown (dotted line), and is much larger than the optimal reserve fraction under ‘‘tax-and-reserve’’
management (dot-dash line).
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model. We found that reserve networks emerged at any
habitat length larger than the period of the reserve
network. Furthermore, the network period was constant
for habitats large enough to support reserve networks.
We also tested an alternative formulation for habitat
damage, in which ﬁsh experience a habitat feedback
through a reduction in density-independent vital rates
(Appendix B). Intriguingly, marine reserve networks did
not emerge in this alternative model formulation under
spatial tax management (Appendix B: Fig. B2), although
full spatial management was most economically efﬁcient
(Appendix B: Fig. B3).
COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT EFFECTS
Economically optimal solutions differ across manage-
ment strategies, leading to marked differences in total
stock biomass, ﬁshery yield, ﬁshing effort, and tax
revenue. By comparing the results of the various
management strategies to one another, and to the
unmanaged baseline case, we can quantify the relative
economic and biological gains of spatial management.
Any form of management produces signiﬁcant bio-
economic beneﬁts by supporting elevated stock and
catch levels (Fig. 6a, b). Full spatial control, as in the
best-case ‘‘spatial-tax’’ strategy, produces the largest
gains, though any form of reserve designation allows
stock biomass and ﬁshery yield to increase relative to the
‘‘nonspatial-tax’’ management strategy. Although the
introduction of reserve networks can brieﬂy bolster ﬁsh
populations in the face of increasing habitat sensitivity
(Fig. 6a), as habitat sensitivity increases both standing
stock (stock biomass) and ﬁshery yield decline.
FIG. 4. The spatial distributions of stock density (solid line) and ﬁshing effort (dashed line) under (a–e) optimal ‘‘nonspatial-
tax,’’ (f–j) ‘‘tax-and-reserve,’’ and (k–o) ‘‘spatial-tax’’ management strategies, shown for increasing habitat sensitivities, c (values 0–
10 from rows 1–5). Reserve locations are indicated by thick x-axes. Note the differing magnitudes of effort axes across management
strategies. Under full spatial management (‘‘spatial tax’’; Case III), reserve networks emerge as optimal as habitat sensitivity
increases.
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‘‘Spatial-tax’’ management also supports elevated
total effort levels relative to the unmanaged baseline,
particularly when multiple reserves are used, concen-
trating heavy ﬁshing into narrow bands between reserves
(Fig. 4l–o). These high effort levels are sustained for a
wide range of habitat sensitivities—and in some cases,
increasing habitat sensitivity actually leads to elevated
total effort levels under optimal ‘‘spatial-tax’’ manage-
ment (Fig. 6c). Generally, increasing habitat sensitivity
produces only modest declines in total effort for any of
the management cases (Fig. 6c). Note that without full
spatial management, as in the ‘‘spatial-tax’’ case, the
imposition of any management reduces total effort levels
relative to the unmanaged baseline.
All three management strategies produce tangible
monetary gains over the unmanaged baseline case, in
which unregulated open access reduces proﬁts to zero in
all locations under all conditions. The greater the degree
of spatial control, the greater the tax-revenue gains: for
all habitat sensitivities evaluated, ‘‘spatial-tax’’ revenues
exceed ‘‘tax-and-reserve’’ revenues, which in turn exceed
‘‘nonspatial-tax’’ revenues (Fig. 6d). Although tax
revenues decline for all management strategies as habitat
sensitivity increases, the relative value of spatial
knowledge is greater in more sensitive habitats. For
example, when c ¼ 15, a manager can approximately
double his or her tax revenues by employing a ‘‘spatial-
tax’’ strategy instead of a ‘‘tax-and-reserve’’ or ‘‘non-
spatial-tax’’ strategy.
ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
We originally designed our model on the assumption
that ﬁsh could diffuse out of the habitat edges and be
lost to the ﬁshery. However, in reality, habitats may be
bounded on one side (as by a shoreline), and ﬁsh may
respond to environmental cues and avoid exiting the
habitat. Thus, we also tested two sets of alternative
boundary conditions: one set with a left reﬂecting
boundary, and one set with two reﬂecting boundaries.
We found that, although effort no longer fell to zero
FIG. 5. Optimal effort distribution for various habitat lengths under ‘‘spatial-tax’’ management. Parameter values are x0¼0.01,
x1¼0.001, and c¼15. Note the emergence of ‘‘reserve networks,’’ with alternating reserves and ﬁshed areas. Each reserve (heavy x-
axis line) is of the same length and is separated from the adjacent reserve by a ﬁshed area, also of uniform length. The sum of these
two lengths is the ‘‘network period.’’
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adjacent to closed boundaries (because diffusion did not
drive ﬁsh biomass below economically viable levels), the
reserve pattern was robust (Fig. 7).
When both habitat edges are closed (i.e., ]u/]x¼ 0 at
x¼‘/2 and x¼ ‘/2), in the absence of ﬁshing, habitat is
of completely homogeneous quality. Intriguingly, even
in this completely homogeneous case, reserves still
emerge (Fig. 7k–o). This mathematically interesting
result also suggests that our results should apply to ﬁsh
with varying degrees of spatial awareness (i.e., ﬁsh that
recognize habitat edges, and have the ability to remain
within their habitats).
DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that closing portions of
habitat to ﬁshing may be not just economically viable,
but also economically beneﬁcial, when ﬁshing damages
habitat. By considering habitat feedbacks from a
FIG. 6. Comparison of (a) stock biomass, (b) ﬁshery yield, (c) ﬁshing effort, and (d) tax revenue integrated over the entire
habitat for four management scenarios: the unmanaged ﬁshery (dotted line), the ‘‘nonspatial-tax’’ limited-management scenario
(dash-dot line), the ‘‘tax-and-reserve’’ management scenario (dashed line), and the ‘‘spatial-tax’’ best-case management scenario
(solid line). Stock biomass is the stock density integrated over the habitat. For all metrics of biological and economic ﬁshery health,
‘‘spatial-tax’’ management produces the best results for all habitat sensitivities. (e–h) Relative increases (and decreases) in biomass,
yield, ﬁshing effort, and tax revenue compared to the ‘‘nonspatial-tax’’ strategy are also shown. Gains (rescaled values . 1) can be
ascribed to the value of spatial knowledge.
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fundamentally economic perspective in continuous
space, we are able to evaluate the consequences of
increasing management control and to observe the
emergence of reserve networks. Because our results
explore the intersection of conservation and economic
goals, they shed light on win–win scenarios and expand
the conditions under which multiple beneﬁts may arise
from spatial closures (Neubert and Herrera 2008).
It is under ﬁrst-best ‘‘spatial-tax’’ management con-
ditions that reserve networks (unﬁshed areas inter-
spersed with shorter regions of high-intensity ﬁshing
effort) emerge. These networks persist even as habitat
size increases (Fig. 5), suggesting that a spatial version
of ‘‘pulse ﬁshing’’ (see descriptions by Klerk and Gatto
[1981] and McCallum [1988]) may be optimal in the
presence of habitat effects.
The network pattern that emerges from the ‘‘spatial-
tax’’ analysis suggests that even limited management
may be made more effective by designating more
numerous, smaller reserves, rather than a single, central
one. However, our study of second-best ‘‘tax-and-
reserve’’ management strategies shows that even single,
central reserves may increase revenues, depending upon
habitat size and sensitivity.
‘‘Tax-and-reserve’’ combinations are optimal because
they work together to protect a segment of ﬁsh habitat
from damage and reduce effort outside of the reserve.
Previous studies have found that constraints on ﬁshing
capacity are critical to maintaining optimal stock density
and ensuring effectiveness of reserves (Hannesson 1998,
Hiddink et al. 2006a). Under the ‘‘tax-and-reserve’’
management scenario studied above, we have seen how
the optimal tax rate declines with increasing reserve
fractions to balance the reduction in effort necessary
from closing additional habitat to ﬁshing.
Perhaps most importantly, we have seen that a spatial
approach to ﬁsheries management may produce signif-
icant gains in proﬁt over nonspatial approaches (such as
FIG. 7. The spatial distributions of biomass density (solid line) and effort (dashed line) under optimal ‘‘spatial tax’’ in response
to varied boundary conditions: (a–e) two open bounds, (f–j) a single (left) reﬂecting bound, and (k–o) and two reﬂecting bounds.
Results are shown for increasing density-independent habitat sensitivities, c (row 1, c¼0; row 2, c¼0.25; row 3, c¼1; row 4, c¼2;
row 5, c ¼ 10); other parameter values are ‘ ¼ 15, x0 ¼ 0.01, and x1 ¼ 0.001.
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the ‘‘nonspatial-tax’’ case), especially in the ﬁrst-best
case of ‘‘spatial-tax’’ management. However, the relative
differences between management outcomes depend
upon habitat sensitivity, c: as c increases, the marginal
gains from full spatial knowledge increase (see, espe-
cially, Fig. 6h). Studies in spatially heterogeneous
systems have highlighted the relative economic gains
from spatially optimized management (e.g., Rassweiler
et al. 2012). Here, our results suggest a value for spatial
knowledge (Costello et al. 2010) even when habitat is of
homogeneous quality in the absence of ﬁshing.
Thus spatially explicit management provides multiple
economic and biological beneﬁts: it allows for elevated
total effort (potentially supporting increased employ-
ment in the ﬁshery), total stock biomass, and total yield,
while generating tax revenue in excess of any other
management strategy (see also Neubert and Herrera
2008). This tax revenue may be retained by the manager
to offset the costs of acquiring spatial knowledge or to
offset enforcement costs, or may be returned through a
variety of mechanisms to the ﬁshing community as a
way of encouraging cooperation with management
programs (Cunningham 1994). Incentive-based manage-
ment schemes (that aim to maintain sustainable, high-
level yields and can return tax to ﬁshermen in the form
of proﬁts where proﬁts were previously totally dissipat-
PLATE 1. A stoplight parrotﬁsh forages amid heterogeneous reef habitat in a Florida Keys marine reserve (USA). Reserves in
Florida, and elsewhere in the Caribbean, are rich with diverse marine life. Photo credit: H. V. Moeller.
July 2013 969HABITAT DAMAGE AND MARINE RESERVES
ed) may be one route to improving ﬁsheries management
(Grafton et al. 2006).
Although full spatial control maximizes ﬁshery
revenue, when habitat sensitivity is sufﬁciently high it
also calls for the enforcement of a reserve network. The
extensive boundaries of such networks (relative to a
single, larger reserve) have generally been seen as costly
from an enforcement perspective (Halpern and Warner
2003, Roberts et al. 2003) because of the additional
perimeter (per unit protected area) that must be
patrolled. Indeed, some models include perimeter
minimization in their reserve-siting algorithms (e.g.,
Leslie et al. 2003). In any real-world implementation of a
reserve network like the one we describe here, a manager
would therefore have to balance the relative economic
gains of optimal spatial management with the relative
costs of defending additional reserve perimeter. Al-
though the economic and conservation gains of full
spatial management relative to other management
strategies rapidly become apparent with increasing
habitat sensitivity (Fig. 6e, f ), the truly optimal man-
agement scenario can only be chosen when enforcement
costs are factored into management decisions.
In contrast to the results discussed above, under an
alternative, density-independent formulation for habitat
damage (see Appendix B), new marine reserves did not
emerge as habitat sensitivity increased from c¼ 0. Thus,
it is clear that the economic optimality of marine
reserves is sensitive to model formulation. It is therefore
important to gather information on the ﬁshing gear in
use, the habitat type and its response to ﬁshing gear, and
the mechanisms through which ﬁsh stocks grow,
reproduce, and respond to habitat damage, before using
models like this one to justify the establishment of
marine reserves.
However, we emphasize that, regardless of manage-
ment options or model formulation, as habitat sensitiv-
ity increases the manager faces inevitable declines in
total stock biomass, ﬁshery yield, and total tax revenue.
Thus, optimal management may well include regulations
to decrease habitat sensitivity, such as gear restrictions
or spatial zoning to avoid more sensitive areas.
Further work is, of course, needed, particularly to
address the spatial and temporal complexities of multi-
stock and multi-use habitats. Here we have considered a
single ﬁsh stock, when real-world reserve designation
must account for the needs of multiple species. When
species of conservation concern vary in their biology,
and particularly in their dispersal capabilities, the
orientation and spacing of reserves will necessarily be
more complex. Additionally, present-day reserve imple-
mentations take place in habitats that have experienced
a patchwork history of human usage, including ﬁshing
damage. To understand the optimal transition from
various initial conditions to a sustainable policy requires
analyses of dynamic spatial bioeconomic models (e.g.,
Brock and Xepapadeas 2008, 2010, Joshi et al. 2009) to
account, for example, for habitat recovery.
This leads us to an important caveat pertaining to our
results: the spatiotemporal distribution of effort that
maximizes the present value of revenue over an inﬁnite
time horizon—call it the maximum economic yield of
effort, EMEY—may look quite different than the full
spatial-control equilibrium solution we have calculated.
The reasons are twofold. First, our analysis essentially
ignores discounting and as a result ignores the potential
costs of the transition to the steady state. Second, as a
result of our equilibrium simpliﬁcation, we were able to
ignore the dynamic response of habitat quality to ﬁshing
pressure, as well as the dynamic response of the vital
rates of the harvested population to habitat quality.
Instead, we were able to jump directly to the equilibrium
response of vital rates to ﬁshing effort (Eq. 6). The
dynamics of these responses will likely inﬂuence EMEY in
potentially complicated ways. In fact, EMEY may not
even asymptotically converge to an equilibrium distri-
bution at all but rather depend on time as well as space.
Despite the aforementioned simpliﬁcations and cave-
ats, our results provide additional evidence that
ecological and economic beneﬁts (applicable to both
ﬁshermen and managers) may result from implementing
long-term spatial monitoring approaches. They also
suggest the possibility that the implementation of spatial
management strategies can be viewed as mutually
beneﬁcial to both conservation biologists and ﬁshermen.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Appendix A
Analysis of the spatial effort tax model (Ecological Archives A023-049-A1).
Appendix B
Density-independent habitat effects (Ecological Archives A023-049-A2).
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